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REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
IN MEDIATING THE PRESENT CRISIS IN POLAND 
by James Wil 1 
Dr. Will is the chairperson of C.A.R.E.E. 
This is his second piece on Poland to appear 
in OPREE; the first one was entitled "The 
Church and Contemporary Social Dynamics in 
Poland" (Vol. I, No. 2, April, 1981). 
Originally delivered as a banquet address at 
the Third North American Christian-Marxist 
Dialogue in Washington, DC on May 29, 1982, 
it was transcribed and with minor stylistic 
changes is presented here in essay form. A 
United Methodist professor of systematic 
theology, James Will teaches at ·Garrctt-
Evangelical Theological Seminary in 
Evanston, Illinois. 
Understanding of the role of the Polish Church in mediating their 
present· social crisis is difficult, not simply because this is a complex 
issue, but: in addition, persons must try to communicate through a number 
of kinds of barriers. For many of us, the first barrier is language. I 
a1 so have discovered that no matter how well I come to know Polish 
sisters and brothers and colleagues, whether Marxist or Christian, there· 
is a kind of cultural barrier. Finally, there is the Protestant-Catholic 
divide between my own Christian tradition and the Chr~stian tradition of 
most Poles. Some of the creative people I know there are Marxists in one 
form or another and members of the Communist Party; so that, of course, 
is another kind of barrier. 
I went to Pol and immediately after the World Council's hearings on 
disarmament in Amsterdam which ended November 28, 1981, and stayed there 
as long as I had intended, until December 22, even though the events of 
December l3 made that problematic for a little while. I remember how 
thank fu 1. l was, when 1 awakened on December 13, that I had had a good 
reason to refuse the invitation to preach in the Methodist Church on that 
Sunday morning. As i.t happened, I had been to the Yiddish theatre in 
W;irsilw the prcvi nus L'Vcning. lt is one of the few such theatres left in 
Europe. As I returned to my hotel in a taxi just after midnight, I passed 
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by the Methodist building with its chapel and the English Language 
College on the corner of Mokotowska and Marszalkowska streets. Just 
behind the Methodist building was the Solidarity headquarters on 
Mokotowska street. I noticed that the whole section was blocked with 
military vehicles and a line of soldiers, so I realized earlier than many 
in Warsaw that something was happening! I went on to the hotel and got up 
Sunday morning to see military vehicles all over. I soon discovered that 
what they call "the state of war" (since emergency laws or martial law as 
such are not specified in their Constitution) had been declared. I do not 
know what I would have said to the Methodist congregation ·on Sunday 
morning, December 13, if l had indeed been in the position to accept that 
invitation. I know what Professor Benedyktovicz, the Methodist pastor who 
also is a professor in the Christian Theological Academy, said. Professor 
Benedyktovicz told me the sermon he had prepared did not seem quite 
appropriate to the moment; he substituted the reading from Revelation 18. 
In that apocalyptic moment he thought it more relevant. 
It is important for us to look concretely at this situation and to 
share some experience and judgment about it. Let us consider first the 
five elements of Polish history that are very relevant to the present 
situation. The realization of justice for any people is the result of a 
long historical struggle. Sometimes our abstractions tend to obscure 
that, whether from the Christian side we talk about natural law and 
natural rights, or in the American translation of that as "endowed by 
their creator with certain inalienable rights." Such language suggests 
that there is a kind of direct ontological relationship between what 
occurs in history and some predetermined structure of right. Whatever we 
think about that, it seems to me that all of us understand that it takes 
a long historical struggle for the realization of those rights. Therefore 
it is important for us to remember certain elements of Polish history 
that are relevant to this present situation. 
The first of them is simply the millenium-long relationship between 
the Christian Church, specifically the Roman Catholic Church, and the 
Polish people. The Piast prince who united those west Slavic tribes in 
900 into what became Poland, was converted and baptized in 966. From that 
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point on there is a kind of intertwining of the religious history and the 
social-political history of Poland that has to be understood. 
Secondly, that millenium-long interrelationship was strengthened by 
the territorial conflict that went on in central Europe between Russia on 
Poland's east and Prussia on Poland's north and west that left a tragic 
legacy of nationalistic hostility. It is largely the result of the 
partitions of. the 19th century which lasted until the treaty of 
Versailles at the end of World War I. 
Thirdly, the fact that the Russians were Orthodox and the Germans 
were Lutheran strengthened the relation of .Polish nationalism and Roman 
Catholicism and augmented the social power of the Church. Unfortunately 
it has also made the Church, perhaps, too focused on Polish national 
problems and has compromised some of the universal dimensions of the 
Church. But since Vatican II, especially with regard to the Papal social 
teaching, Poland is one of the places where that teaching has been t.aken 
most seriously. At least some of the human rights dimensions of "Pacem in 
Terris" and Vatican II have been made a constant kind of teaching base in 
the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. But the social power of the Church 
really is the result of its being identified with the nation. 
Fourthly, the boundaries created at Yalta and Potsdam have made 
Poland a very homogeneous society ethnically and religiously. The German 
people were moved out from Silesia and Pomerania in the west as the 
result of those decisions at Yalta and Potsdam. What had been a very 
large Orthodox population in eastern Poland during the Yagellonian period 
is now a Ukrainian population in the Soviet Union. Poland was not always 
homogeneous. It was one of the first societies in Europe that had to 
learn a kind of tolerance, not a perfect tolerance but a kind of 
tolerance in which Orthodox and ~atholic populations could live together 
within the same state. A certain tolerance was also developed towards the 
Jews in Poland so that there would be upwards of three million Jews there 
to be destroyed during the Holocaust. In point of fact, there are now 
only ten thousand Jews (at least that is the number constantly given) 
left in Poland--about two thousand of them practicing, four thousand more 
related to a Jewish cultural association and another four thousand not 
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identified directly with a Jewish comnunity. It is a small population and 
it is very difficult to deal with that history of what happened in the 
Warsaw Getto, Auschwitz and elsewhere. But now Poland is a very 
homogeneous population in borders that are close to ancient Poloniae and 
that enhances also the social power of the Church. 
As the fifth historical point, we should note that the Communist 
Party in Poland has come closer to the Polish national tradition ever 
since 1956, when Wladislaw Gomulka came out .of jail and house arrest much 
against the will of Khruschev and company, who had come to Warsaw to 
block it and had even set their military forces in motion towards Warsaw. 
Nevertheless, they were persuaded to allow Gomulka, who was looked upon 
as a kind of Polish nationalist-Titoist, to head the party. From 1956 on 
there has developed an increasing Polish nationalism also in the 
Communist Party; and that Polish national tradition includes, of course, 
the Church. One of the things that astonished me in 1980, though I have 
not, of course, been in any position to check it out beyond that, is the 
affirmation from sociologists in the. Academy of Catholic Theology and 
Lublin University that 50 percent of the Communist Party in 1980 was made 
up of practicing Roman Catholics. The nomenclature system kept them at 
lower 1 eve ls in the party, but nevertheless the rank and file of the 
party was made up in very large part of Roman Catholics. Many of them--! 
don't know the proportions--faded away by the hundreds of thousands in 
1980-81. Thus the structure of the party may be somewhat different now, 
but before all of these events there was a large overlap between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Communist Party in Poland. 
The crucial dimensions of the Polish struggle since 1948 have been 
with the Soviet-imposed system of socialism. (Not all might agree with 
that way of putting it, but I think most of the Poles I know would 
agree.) This is complicated by the Soviet Union's perceived security need 
for a buffer zone between itself and Germany. So Poland was built into a 
Soviet-dominated economic and military system. This was and is deeply 
resented and resisted by the vast majority of the Polish people on 
national grounds. Out of this long history of hostility they look upon 
Soviet imperialism as simply an extension of tsarist imperialism that 
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they had struggled against for centuries. ·They are not always careful to 
make the kind of distinctions that reality might require. This opposition 
is also on cultural grounds. The Polish ~eople have been deeply 
influenced by a tradition of tolerance that developed. One of the 
fascinating aspects of that is that they had one of the first 
constitutionally limited monarchies and a parliamentary system which, 
though limited to the nobility, was nevertheless open thereby to 15 
percent of the population. At one point in the 16th century a majority of 
that nobility that made up the parliament was Calvinist, more for 
political reasons than religious (because they were very careful not to 
allow Calvinism to reach down to the peasants). They wanted Calvinism as 
a justification for the role of the laity in both religious and political 
leadership. The influence of the Enlightenment clearly had a profound 
effect on Poland in a way that it did not reach into Russia. Therefore 
there are very strong cultural differences, as well as national 
differences that fueled the resentmeni ~nd resistance. 
The Roman Catholic Church under Cardinal Wyszynski fol lowed a very 
wise course in the midst of this difficult history. It took the position 
much earlier than those who led the councils of state in the Vatican, 
that it was possible for the Roman Catholic Church in Poland to cooperate 
with a socialist government insofar as that socialist government could be 
perceived as trying to create a just society on the basis of the common 
good. There was a kind of self-confidence as Wyszynski led the Church in 
that route, which indicates the perceived strength of the Roman Cathotic 
Church in Poland. I remember being told the story of those faithful laity 
who would ·question their Cardinal Primate as to the wisdom of meeting 
with Cominunist leaders, negotiating with them or entering into agreements 
with them. At least the story goes that Cardinal Wyszynski' s response 
was: "My dearest, it is much more dangerous for them than for us." I 
really think this was the percept ion. The Church early on took the 
position that they would seek to protect the personal dignity and the 
human rights of all the Polish people. In this process they accepted, or 
tried to accept insofar as a Church that has a national identification 
can, the separation of Church and State--understood as not a separation 
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of Chui:-ch and nation, but of Church and State, a Communist State. They 
accepted that in terms of direct access to political power, but they 
worked to extend the cultural influence and the social power of the 
Church, which, as Professor Swiecicki said to me some time ago, is in the 
long run political power, but in the short run it is not. 
The Roman Catholic Church in Poland has taken the papal social 
teaching on human rights very seriously and has used their power 
persuasively to affect the moral dimensions of public policy, as they 
undei:-stand them. "Pacem in Terris," when it was published in 1963 as the 
first systematization of the Roman Catholic teaching on human rights in 
rel at ion to peace, became the basis of nineteen lectures given by the 
Cardinal in Warsaw on the implications of the teaching of "Pacem in 
Terris" for Polish society. The Episcopate sponsored a symposium in 1973, 
on the tenth anniversary of "Pacem in Terris," on the theme of the 
realization of human rights as a necessary condition of both domestic and 
international peace. One sentence from that document indicates the way in 
which this human rights teaching became a kind of premise for the role 
that the Church has played in the more recent events. It reads: "A person 
must not be a merely passive object of the government, but must be the 
active element of the social life." 
Much was also made of the teaching of "Gaudium et Spes," so that 
when th.is teaching of "The Church in the Modern World" was directly 
relevant to the events of 1980-1981, they had already established this as 
the univei:-sal teaching of the Church and not just some kind of 
opportunistic political action on their part. Section 68 of "Gaudium et 
Spes" teaches that among the basic human rights must be counted the right 
of freely founding labor unions and taking part freely in the activities 
of these unions. Without the risk of reprisal, it was exactly to this 
article that they referred in supporting the emergence of ~oiidari~y in 
August, 1980. They continued to support it by their good counsel, 
prnviding a circle of advisers that were often, in my judgment, more 
prudent, more careful and more wise than the kind of counsel that came 
from Jacek Kuron and the leaders of KOR. They sought always to proceed 
moderately in terms of the political reality of Poland and tried to keep 
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Solidarity on the track of being an independent labor union and not an 
alternate political party. 
Let me say more about the Communist Party, which I do not know as 
well as the Church. I have come to 'know some excellent members of that 
party, especially in the Polish Institute of International Affairs. I 
have been interested in the role that Poland has played in disarmament 
negotia,tions from the first stages .of the emergence of a Polish national 
party. The Gomulka government early proposed the so-called Rapacki plan 
looking towards an atomic-free zone in central Europe. This seems again 
to be very current and relevant, but with the initiative now emerging 
more from the Netherlands and the German Federal Republic peace forces. 
There is in Poland a certain resonance on the basis of the Rapacki plan 
to that proposal for nuclear-free zones in central Europe or in the whole 
of Europe. In dealing with these Marxist-oriented experts on disarmament 
in the Polish Institute for International Affairs, I have come to 
understand some of the dynamics of the party. The party bas become 
increasingly nationalistic since Gomulka in 1956 and increasingly 
pragmatic ·since Gierek in 1971. Pragmatic in the good sense--less 
dogmatic and less ideological. But pragmatic also in the bad sense--less 
moral. I think that corrnnit ted Marxists are often highly , ethical and 
pragmatic Marxists less ethical. 
The Gierek government sought rapid expansion to fulfill what I would 
understand to be a socialist goal--that is, a goal for full employment 
for a growing population. Poland is one of the few growing populations in 
Europe and it is a kind of dynamic society that has to keep growing 
rather rapidly industrially if full employment in any meaningful sense is 
to be achieved. I think the Gierek government aimed at that and, of 
course, aimed at meeting the consumer needs of a population that had 
suffered greatly, that had sacrificed much in the rebuilding of a 
devastated society, and now expected some of the fruits of that bard 
work. 
There was rapid expansion, which faltered in the latter half of the 
'70s for a number of reasons. There was a technical and admistrative 
incapacity that could not keep up with the role of development they were 
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.. 
trying to achieve. There was a growing corruption, unfortunately, in the 
governing class and in the administration, as well as amongst the 
workers. Even those at the top of the society were involved in it, and 
about forty of them are under arrest and indictment by the military 
government. A further problem was a kind of "verbal fundamentalism" of 
the plan. That is a theological category, but it strikes me that often 
there is an attitude towards the plan by Communists which is akin to a 
fundamentalistic attitude towards the Bible. If it is written, it has to 
be true! They simply carried on a propaganda of success on the basis of 
the plan which was so far from reality that it created a kind of distrust 
and even disgust for that whole process. I can recall them telling me the 
farce of the dedication of the largest carpet plant they have in Lodz. It 
finally came on line fourteen months after the plan had indicated it 
should. There was never any admission that that was the case. The 
directors kept coming on television saying it is. right on schedule and 
getting their awards for doing so. When it was supposed to be dedicated, 
they spent two weeks building a false wall across that part which wasn't 
finished and set up all the machinery they could. Gierek came and they 
paraded him around and took television shots of all of this, and he 
dedicated it as though it were finished right on schedule. Well, fourteen 
months later it was finally "finished. All of that was known, well known, 
and resented. 
The Western recession after 1975 complicated their plans for sale of 
products in the West and repayment of loans on the basis ~f those sales. 
They had thought, for instance, that the Fiats they were building could 
be sold in the West, or the Fiat Company could sell them in the Third 
World. Of course, it became impossible after 1975. The imbalance of 
foreign trade in the late '70s, with the necessary adjustments of cutting 
imports, increasing exports and the pace of production for export, led to 
growing resentment amongst the workers. This discontent with, and 
distrust of, the system, as we know, broke out in the widespread strikes 
of 1980-1981. 
The Communist Party, insofar as I understand its own thinking about 
this issue, deals with it in terms of a crisis precipitated by a growing 
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contradiction between the level of productive forces, a higher technical 
capacity amongst the work force, and the organization of production 
relations. The Marxists, .at least, join most of the others in and outside 
the Church in Poland, to support the formula of an independent labor 
union. Everybody still intends to reconstitute an independent labor union 
in Poland; but without the political radicalism that had developed in 
Solidarity. That means that they want it reorganized in terms of a 
national industrial and trade union, but not with the regional 
organization that Solidarity had, which made it the greatest political 
power in each voyevodship in Poland. Solidarity deliberately organized in 
that way for exactly that kind of political strength. It is that 
structure of organization that was reflected in the National Committee 
meeting in Gdansk just prior to the time martial law was declared. Those 
regional representatives had struggled at the local level with a party 
and. bure.aucracy in the administration, the economy and the government 
which represented the old line "persons in place," because of the 
T)omenclature system, that strongly resisted reforms--even reforms that 
were agreed to at the national level were not being implemented at local 
and regional levels. There was this kind of great tension developing 
everywhere throughout the country. Those representatives coming from 
these regions to the national Committee of Solidarity were far more 
radical than the Presidium, even though the Presidium had become 
increasingly radicalized. It was exactly their counsel and their 
decisions that finally led the government of General Jaruzelski to 
declare martial law. 
To find some kind of formula that would allow for an independent 
labor union without that political radicalism seems to be the intention, 
at least the expressed intention, of everyone in and outside of 
government. They, however, cannot find the formula for reestablishing 
negotiations. The Church '.s formula from the beginning, just three days 
after the. declaration of martial law when the General Committee of the 
Episcopate met on December 17, which they have expressed over and over 
again, is that the .Presidium of Solidarity and Lech Walesa must be 
released to take up negotiations, which may reconstitute Solidarity in a 
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mode that expresses 
will moderate the 
the social forces that have emerged within it, yet 
I 
political radic~lism that endangered not only 
Solidarity but all of Poland, given its geo-political situation. 
The Polish Catholic Social Union, which is one 
mediating between the Church and the State, that 
of the three groups 
specifically bases 
itself on Catholic social teaching, tried to develop such a formula prior 
to martial law. They tried to persuade the Episcopate to support them in 
the creation of a Christian political party that would take the political 
onus off of Solidarity and would incorporate into a party structure those 
political dimensions that did not properly belong to a labor union. The 
Primate and the Episcopate did not support that not ion of a Christian 
party. Since martial law, they have been trying to persuade the 
Episcopate to support them in the creation of Christian labor unions that 
could take the forces of Solidarity, now suspended, into a new formula 
that would be acceptable. But again the Church does not support that. The 
Church, it seems to me, does not want so direct a political involvement, 
but has sought to mediate between the government and the social forces as 
they have emerged in Solidarity in a reconciling fashion that can hold 
the Polish nation together. 
I was interested to find, when I was there, that the new economic 
law which was in large part formulated prior to martial law has now been 
adopted by the Seym, the parliament. That law tries to find its own way 
of resolving the contradiction between the new level of productiv·e forces 
and the organization of productive re lat ions, by providing for worker-
.management councils. But the workers are so alienated that in most 
instances the government is afraid to implement this law. They have begun 
to implement it in some very small and unimportant factories, but in none 
of the major factories are they in the position to even begin to 
implement that notion of worker-management councils. 
The dominant social reality in Poland today is a kind of rage, a 
kind of deep and terrible anger. It grows ol.lt of the frustration of a 
stalemate between the party hardliners, as I would call them, and almost 
the whole population under thirty--and that is a very large part of the 
polish population, which is a relatively youthful one. The average age of 
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the workers in Gdansk is only twenty-five. On the one hand there are 
persons like Olshovski, one of the hardliners who controls the mass media 
nnd follows a provocative propaganda policy. Even some of the party 
memb(~rs would suggest that he does so precisely to foment demonstrations 
and to bring down the Jaruzelski government. I refer to the kind of 
demonstrations that occurred on May 1, 1982, accepted first, then again 
on May 3~ put down by the government, and on May 13, more brutally put 
down. 
On the other hand, the students and youth are constantly ready to be 
ignited. Some of my friends· who teach, Professor Kondziela from Lublin 
University and Professor Sw:i,ecicki from the Academy of Catholic Theology, 
told me that it is almost impossible for them to exercise any influence 
over their students on these issues. They have to marshal all the 
inte 1.lectual and moral force they have to give any kind of prudent 
counsel to their students. The students are proud to be.in jail or to 
have been interned. There. is a readiness for a kind of tragic heroism, 
throwing themselves on the barricades without perhaps any hope of 
success. The result of the May demonstrations, for instance, was the 
arrest of two of the deans of faculty in the University of Warsaw because 
of their relationship· .to these students. Fortunately, they were soon 
. released. 
The Church stresses· in this situation non-violence, moderation, and 
negotiations. I want to end by quoting what Archbishop Glemp said about 
this·"rage. 11 He spoke in Rome and directed these words more to some of us 
in the West than to his own people. When he was in Rome on February 7, 
1982 and preached in St. Stanislaus he said: "Our Fatherland is sick. The 
Poles are overcome by anger. We are enraged against one another. It is a 
strong wrath and can be directed at several social groups." And then he 
said: "We are confident that with God's help we will be able to explain 
to ourselves the reasons for our anger in a dialogue and not by force. 
Poland must not become an arena of bloody confrontation. No one must be 
al lowed to manipulate our wrath." That is, of course, the sentence 
directed to us, to our government, to its policy of sanctions, to Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty. "No one must be· allowed to manipulate our 
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wrath, because the people want to shed this illness of rage all by itself 
and emerge all in one." He includes in those people the Communist Party 
members, some but not all of whom are Roman Catholics. 
The Polish national tradition and the identification of the Polish 
Church with the entire Polish nation is expressed beautifully in this, 
"because the people want to shed their illness of rage all by itself and 
emerge all in one, and be healed." Be shalom! Be whole! And it seems to 
me that the Church, whatever its shortcomings, with regard to the way in 
which it has acted in relation to the Polish Communist Party, in relation 
to these pulsating points of confrontation between the Polish people and 
that Party, the evolution of the Party 9s a national party, the 
democratization of some aspects of Polish life and the way in which it 
has worked for an atmosphere of moderation, of non-viqlence, of dialogue 
for the unity of the whole nation is, I think, commendable. I am grateful 
to understand and appreciate a part of that and to have been able to be 
associated with some Polish Church leaders whom I admire a great deal. 
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